Almost no one would be with the assertion that Erich von Manstein better at the operational level military commanders of World War II in place, if not the best arguMent. However, because of the decisions Manstein during and after the war, was also among the most controversial figures. Despite the central role in the war, Manstein, there was no official biography has been written about him. In the Field Marshal von Manstein The Janus Head, A Portrait-known military historianMarcel Stein adDresses this gap in research on the war. This stone has driven a stake through the heart of persistent myths regarding Manstein and his role in the war. In addition, Stone and the scope of his work and expanded sent the German major said, the general moral decline, participation in the Holocaust and the central square of the mismanageMent of the war effort.
Manstein stood as a symbol for all that the German Wehrmacht is incredible, saystactical and operational level capabilities the military during the war, and their moral depravity. Perhaps the most important value for the work of Stein offers to fans of military history, is among the many, such as stone links his discussion of the main themes of Manstein during the war and how we got to remember.
For example, Manstein stone used as a vehicle to explain how deeply involved the German General Staff and commanders in the field were the Holocaust, as well asselFish as a huge false picture of the war. Stone periodically transitions to explain his discussion of von Manstein career, how to embrace the German officer corps' of Nazi ideology, a secular tradition of military service affected. Consequently, obsessed, even if the Third Reich officer corps opens a much talent as the Kaiser's Germany in World War I, the characteristic of criminal behavior Wehrmacht officer corpsplayed a leadership role in the destruction of the Third Reich.
Stone shows how Hitler's top military leaders, men and Manstein delivered impressive victories in times underestimated but, perhaps as a result and consequently the power and the power of the Red Army at the end they play a central role in the destruction of the Nazi experiment misunderstood. For example, on the one hand, and operational Manstein was a genius. It 'was the author of the plan for the defeatcombined force of British troops, French, Belgians and Dutch in a few weeks. While only 20 years had failed before and after four years of war that imperial Germany to do the same. In addition, Manstein execution of a body in the first months of Barbarossa motorized clear him best as the leader of the great war mobile units. Manstein added to this reputation, as the beginning of 1943, handed over a counter so incredible that it has affected his life-giving Red ArmyHeels. Manstein counteroffensive, although the most successful so far followed the Red Army in the war, Zhukov and Stalin believed the Red Army to provide energy to indicate a defensive position by the end of the year, pushing their plans for the offensive, and Marschall necessary after the German summer offensive early in Kursk.
Events at Kursk was to prove crucial to understanding the relationship between Manstein weaknesses and failings of his colleagues in theBody of German officers' rank higher. At Kursk, one of the two elements have often been ignored Manstein explain failure as a military leader was perhaps better to admit to his monumental arrogance and resulting disability, if he had made a mistake. Manstein arrogant approach to fight the Red Army were the focus of the events in Kursk. Manstein played a central role in convincing Hitler to begin operating the citadel, even if the Red Army in the Kursk is one of thefortresses in the world, a fact that the Germans were well aware. Then, after the Citadel had failed to achieve its stated objectives, Manstein ignored the reality and urged the continuation of the offensive. Manstein then not take responsibility for the failure of the Citadel, even when the Red Army is its summer offensive, and drove several German armies to the breaking point.
Manstein was the second major vulnerability in relation to his military leadership was his naked ambitioncompeting requests, the chief of the German ambition presented prominently on countless occasions during the war. Ambition Manstein was the most spectacular in his repeated attempts to hide their mistakes. A failure of command, most frequently during his leadership of the Army and 11 Army Group Don revealed he avoided when important decisions are in two cases. For example, in his role as commander of Army Group Don, Manstein refused to make aDecision-making process and its alleged failure to provide a clear break with the theme of Stalingrad, an order that saved the German army surrounded the sixth. Manstein lack of courage in relation to the bypass command of Hitler shows how Manstein career goals in the first place, moral cowardice was an essential component of his leadership style. Moreover, often Manstein launched his subordinates to the wolves, presumably for fear of the wrath of Hitler, even ifmany other German military high command would be ignored Hitler during the war, and so relatively unscathed, despite their weaknesses. These men, as a model and Hausser, at key moments in the first war to bring their husbands, even if it means the end of their careers.
Manstein was more of a symbol of success and failures of the German army on the battlefield. Stone also helps the reader understand the latent anti-Semitism and racismpenetrates the body of German officer during the war, exploring Manstein regular participation in the genocide of the definition of Wehrmacht campaign in Eastern Europe. Stone to present the results of criminal depravity German officer corps', not only ignore the laws of war, but support for the genocide of millions of Slavs, Jews, Gypsies and other innocent people.
In addition, Stein also examines how after the war, Manstein led the way to transformThe historiography of the war. Manstein under the influence of historiography flowed from an image and myth of Germany's military officers who survived the war has created. Unfortunately, this myth was the shockingly good time. A myth to think of the millions who led the Wehrmacht not involved in the genocide, but served as a vocational school and honorable, committed not only above the tragedy of the SS was, but knew almost nothing. Furthermore, not onlyThe fighting has reportedly Wehrmacht with clean hands, according to Manstein and his followers, but also a myth that people had planted the director says Wehrmacht won the war without interference from Hitler's Germany would. Stone's book, if nothing else, an important reading, as he has a comprehensive approach to these harmful myths.
Stein work over the decades of German military history. The first half of the book provides a summary of the career of Manstein, then movesthrough a detailed study of the most important events of his career. These chapters include a look at the great military successes and his mistakes Manstein, the Battle of France, Manstein the command of Army Group Don and the German attack on Kursk, including the planning phase, discussed in detail. The second part of the book examines the first decision to join Manstein and fall of Hitler was the German military resistance movement. The bookManstein then describes the participation in the Holocaust, his trial for war crimes after the war, and concludes with the demolition of the post-war Manstein tried to throw himself in the best light possible.
My discomfort at work are low. Although no operational or tactical military history, some maps would have been more useful. The book covers events taking place across Europe, in particular, are some of the villages in the Soviet Union also mentioned the darkwell-informed reader. Additional maps can be understood much, in which these events took place have helped. In addition, the development of take a little 'sloppy at times is not enough, the strengths of the book, but enough to show, it's a little' annoying, and potentially a cause of confusion for a person with an acquaintance of the war.
Overall, the book is a valuable addition to the stone of the available literature on the war. Work Stein fills important gaps in whatis known well beyond the war, adding to what is known about the involvement of the Wehrmacht during the Holocaust, and helps to destroy decades of myths still prevalent, more than 60 years after the war. I recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about Germany and World War II.Book Review of Marshal von Manstein The Janus Head, A Portrait